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Summary 
The present work puts forward a rule-based model for judging the direction of a contingency. A set 
of “alignment rules” (ARs) is defined, all of which bind frequent observations to frequent observations 
and infrequent observations to infrequent observations. These rules qualify as possible mechanisms 
behind pseudocontingencies (PCs, Fiedler, Freytag, & Meiser, 2009). Six experiments, involving social and 
non-social stimuli, are presented that pit the predictions of the rule-based PCs against associative models 
for contingency judgments (Van Rooy, Van Overwalle, Vanhoomissen, Labiouse, & French, 2003). Results 
consistently show that participants associate predictors with criteria that are non-contingent but jointly 
frequent and rare. Crucially, these illusory contingency judgments are shown to persist (a) in attitude 
ratings after extended observational learning and (b) at asymptote in operant learning. In sum, the 
results are evidence for the impact of rule-based PCs under conditions that call for associative learning. 
In a next step, rational arguments (Anderson, 1990) are used to set the AR apart from other rule-based 
models with similar empirical predictions. Results of two simulations reveal that the AR performs 
remarkably well under real-life constraints. Under clearly definable conditions, like strongly skewed base 
rates and small observational samples, the AR performs even better than other models, like ΔP (Allan, 
1993) or the Sum-of-Diagonals (SoD, Inhelder & Piaget, 1958). Finally, the AR is claimed to be a natural 
by-product of the learning history with strong contingencies. Suggestive evidence from a simulation is 
provided that shows an increased likelihood of jointly skewed base rates, the precondition for ARs, in the 
presence of strong contingencies. Thus, ARs might develop from a confusion of the learned above 
chance probability p ( joint-skew | strong-contingency ) with an above chance probability p ( strong-
contingency | joint –skew ) that justifies an AR inference. Possible future research on how joint 
observations and base-rates interact to influence contingency judgments is outlined.  
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1. Introduction  
Imagine you want to decrease the rate at which you get a cold. But you have doubts about 
whether the common-place explanations apply to your life in particular. Your general world knowledge 
tells you a myriad of possible causes that might increase the risk, like stress, or decrease the risk, like 
sports, or might do either but you do not have an expectation in which direction, like the food you eat. 
To find out about what has a causal impact you are willing to change things. So the question is where to 
start? Probably, most people would agree that you should identify what is statistically related to catching 
a cold and in what direction. Exactly these judgments about the direction of contingencies, whether zero, 
positive or negative, are the subject of the present work. 
The example of causal induction illustrates how judgments about contingencies might help us 
understanding and improving our daily life. In fact, knowledge about contingencies has not only been a 
key in causal induction (e.g., Cheng, 1997) but, more generally, has been considered the key to “explain 
the past, control the present and predict the future” (Crocker, 1981, p. 272). Given the prominent status 
of contingency judgments, a large amount of research has addressed the question of how contingencies 
are judged. Most models involve the contingency judgments between two binary variables. For example, 
a predictor with the values P1 and P2 is presented and followed by a criterion with the values C1 and C2 
(c.f. Table 1).  
  Criterion  
  C1 
 
 
C2  
Predictor 
P1 
 
A B BR P1 
P2 
 
 
C D BR P2 
  BR C1 BR C2  
Table 1. Frequency table illustrating different sources of information for contingency judgment models.  
One of the most prominent models of contingencies between two binary variables is ΔP (Ward & 
Jenkins, 1965):  
∆𝑃 =
𝐴
𝐴+𝐵
−
𝐶
𝐶+𝐷
      (1) 
ΔP compares the conditional frequencies of C1 being present given P1 to the conditional frequency 
of C1 being present given P2. If the conditional frequencies are different, ΔP indicates a contingency 
different from zero, with the direction according to which conditional frequency is larger. As can be seen, 
ΔP relies on the cell frequencies (A, B, C and D). For the organism trying to use ΔP these cell frequencies 
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correspond to joint observations of predictor and criterion. These observations do not have to be 
observed at the same time. But the organism has to be able to coordinate the instances at least in 
memory. ΔP is usually accepted as a normative standard (Allan, 1980). Additionally, it has repeatedly 
been found to covary with human contingency judgments (e.g., Allan, 1980; Alloy & Abramson, 1979; 
Shanks, 1985; Wasserman, Dorner, & Kao, 1990) and thus served as a starting point for psychological 
models for contingency judgments.  
A comprehensive review of these psychological models for contingency judgment is beyond the 
scope of the present work. But it is intriguing to note that judging contingencies between events that are 
either very frequent or very rare, i.e. characterized by skewed base rates (BR 1 ≠ BR 2 in Table 1), has 
repeatedly played a major role in the development of models for contingency judgments. For example, 
when P1 and C1 denote the presence of predictor and criterion, contingency judgments increase with an 
increasing frequency of C1 independent of ΔP, the so called outcome density effect (Allan, 1980; Allan & 
Jenkins, 1983; Alloy & Abramson, 1979). Similar effects have been found for increasing frequencies of 
the predictor (Allan & Jenkins, 1983, Exp. 3) and, in a somewhat unrelated body of research on 
stereotype formation, for jointly skewed base rates of predictor and criterion (Hamilton & Gifford, 1976; 
Mullen & Johnson, 1990). These influences have sparked interest in models that are sensitive to skewed 
base rates (Cheng & Novick, 1990; Wasserman et al., 1990). For example, an easy model initially 
proposed by Inhelder and Piaget (Inhelder & Piaget, 1958) compares the frequencies of predictor-
criterion combinations that support a (positive) contingency (cells A and D) to those combinations that 
disconfirm it (cells B and C). This sum-of-diagonals (SoD) model increases with an increasing skew of 
predictor and criterion base rates for the same value of ΔP. A different set of models has accommodated 
the influence of skewed base rates within associative learning processes (Van Rooy et al., 2003). As we 
will see below, these models explain base rate influences as a result of pre-asymptotic learning with 
unequal learning opportunities. In sum, the non-normative influence of skewed base rates has been a 
touchstone of models of contingency judgments and will form the heart of the present work. 
Until recently it has been shared consensus that skewed base rates influence contingency 
judgments by changing the frequencies of joint observations. For example, all of the 41 models 
competitively reviewed by Hattori and Oaksford (2007) converge in the assumption that the cell entries 
A, B, C and D of a contingency table are processed to arrive at a contingency estimate. This focus on cell 
entries has been challenged by the development of the pseudocontingency framework (PC, Fiedler & 
Freytag, 2004; Fiedler, Freytag, & Meiser, 2009) that subsumes a broader array of base rate influences. 
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The most radical novelty in this PC framework assumes that jointly skewed base rates are directly 
integrated in contingency judgments. If two variables both have a frequent and an infrequent level, PCs 
predict a positive contingency between the frequent levels and between the infrequent levels of the 
variables. Thus, in the PC framework to contingency judgments it is possible that the alignment of jointly 
skewed base rates is uniquely responsible for contingency judgments. 
In essence, the present work seeks to gain insight into how the direct influence of jointly skewed 
base rates interacts with the indirect influence mediated by the cell frequencies. In three steps, I will 
seek to establish a rule-based model, the alignment rule (AR), to capture the direct influence. First, I will 
provide empirical evidence that is easily explained by rule-based models like the AR, but not by 
competing associative models. Then, I will use rational arguments to show that the AR is superior to 
other to cell-entry based models, like SoD, given clearly definable circumstances. Finally, I will illustrate 
possible mechanisms how the AR is acquired. I will conclude that jointly skewed base rates are likely to 
exert a direct influence on contingency judgments even if joint observations are available. I start by 
illustrating the PC framework and by reviewing empirical evidence, before defining the AR.  
2. Pseudocontingencies: contingency judgments under direct base-
rate influence 
To define PCs, consider the simplest case of a 2 by 2 frequency table (cf. Table 1). The direct base-
rate influence of PCs states that judgments about the direction of a contingency (negative, positive or 
zero) are directly based on base-rate information (c.f. BR P1, BR P2, BR C1, BR C2). A PC different from 
zero is implied if the attributes’ base rates are jointly skewed, e.g. BR P1> BR P2 and BR C1 > BR C2. A PC 
inference then associates the frequent level of one attribute with frequent level of the other attribute, 
and analogously, the infrequent level with the other infrequent level. Formally, a PC can be defined as 
(see also, Freytag, Kutzner, Vogel, & Fiedler, 2009):  
𝑖𝑓:  
𝐵𝑅 𝑃1 > 𝐵𝑅 𝑃2 ∩ 𝐵𝑅 𝐶1 > 𝐵𝑅 𝐶2
𝐵𝑅 𝑃1 < 𝐵𝑅 𝑃2 ∩ 𝐵𝑅 𝐶1 < 𝐵𝑅 𝐶2
 𝑃𝐶 ∶= 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 
𝑖𝑓:  
𝐵𝑅 𝑃1 > 𝐵𝑅 𝑃2 ∩ 𝐵𝑅 𝐶1 < 𝐵𝑅 𝐶2
𝐵𝑅 𝑃1 < 𝐵𝑅 𝑃2 ∩ 𝐵𝑅 𝐶1 > 𝐵𝑅 𝐶2
 𝑃𝐶 ∶= 𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒   (2) 
𝑖𝑓:  𝐵𝑅 𝑃1 = 𝐵𝑅 𝑃2 ∪ 𝐵𝑅 𝐶1 = 𝐵𝑅 𝐶2 𝑃𝐶 ∶= 𝑧𝑒𝑟𝑜 
Thus, we speak of a PC if the alignment of predictor and criterion base rates produces a 
contingency judgment of the form:”If observations have frequent and rare attributes, then frequent 
attributes coincide and rare attributes coincide”. This different way to contingency assessment is called 
P a g e  |8 
 
“pseudo,” because it ignores the cell entries necessary for normative contingency assessment. In sum, 
PCs represent a new model of contingency judgments because it allows jointly skewed base rates, in 
contrast to joint observations, to cause a judgment about the direction of a contingency. 
By now, there is a considerable body of evidence for this new way to contingency judgments (for a 
review, Fiedler, Freytag, & Meiser, 2009). The most straight forward demonstration of the base-rate-only 
influence arises when contingency judgments follow the aligned base rates in the absence of joint 
observations. For example, in a modification of an illusory correlation paradigm, McGarty and colleagues 
showed that a majority group was more strongly associated with a frequent valence. Crucially, 
participants had just been informed about the majority and the minority status of the groups and, 
independently, observed a stream of mainly positive behaviors (McGarty, Haslam, Turner, & Oakes, 
1993). Similarly, Fiedler and Freytag (2004, Exp. 1) found contingency judgments between the diet of 
patients and the strength of their symptoms without being able to coordinate the both pieces of 
information for each patient. This evidence illustrates how jointly skewed base rates alone are sufficient 
to trigger contingency judgments. However, it does not provide evidence for the impact of jointly 
skewed base rates when joint observations are available. 
Evidence that PCs intrude the realm of cell-entry based models for contingency judgments stems 
from research on tasks providing joint observations. Previous work has controlled the normative model 
ΔP while manipulating the joint skew of the base rates. An example of these conditions is the seminal 
demonstration of frequency based illusory correlations by Hamilton and Gifford (1976). In this paradigm, 
the base rates of groups and valence of behaviors are both skewed at a ratio of around 2:1. This creates 
the conditions for a PC resulting in a positive contingency between group A and positive behaviors. In 
contrast, the conditional frequencies of positive and negative behaviors are equal in both groups, thus 
that the ΔP model would predict a zero contingency (c.f. Table 2).  
 Positive behavior 
 
 
Negative behavior  
Group A 
 
18 8 26 
 
Group B 
 
 
9 4 13 
 27 12 39 
Table 2. Frequency table indicating the stimulus distribution used by Hamilton and Gifford (1976, Exp. 1).  
A large body of evidence indicates that judgments are in line with PCs under these illusory 
correlation conditions (for a review see, Mullen & Johnson, 1990) or even when the ΔP model indicates a 
contingency of opposing sign (Fiedler, 2009; Fiedler & Freytag, 2004). PC-inferences despite diverging 
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ΔPs have also been shown to generalize to different domains such as personality assessment in a clinical 
setting (Freytag, Vogel, Kutzner, & Fiedler, 2009), over different procedures like the IAT (Blümke & 
Fiedler, 2009) and affective priming (Fiedler, Freytag, & Blümke, 2009) and to situations involving 
multiple variables (Fiedler, 2009). In sum, there is ample evidence that contingency judgments between 
variables with jointly skewed base rates result in the trade-off between PCs and ΔP. However, as 
anticipated, different mechanisms might be involved in producing these PC effects, some rule based 
some associative. 
The present work aims at gaining insight into how different mechanisms interact to produce these 
PCs that are a trade-off with the cell-entry based ΔP-model. To do so, I will study contingency judgments 
in the simplest case of two dichotomous variables in a single context and make joint observations 
available that constitute a zero contingency for the ΔP-model. Creating conditions for asymptotic 
learning, I will provide empirical evidence easily explained by rule-based but not associative models for 
PCs. I follow Shanks (Shanks, 2007, p. 297) in distinguishing the two classes of models by assuming that 
associative models involve the processing of the “raw” events; whereas rule-based models transform the 
stream of observations into concepts, such as joint frequencies or base rates. Several labels have been 
used to describe these rule-based approaches to contingency judgments, such as intuitive judgments 
strategies (McKenzie, 1994), inferential judgments (Shanks, 2007) or rules-based judgments (Allan, 
1993). In the current work I will use the term rule based to avoid the ambiguity involved in the term 
intuition and because the models discussed are less elaborate than the inferential models that have 
been proposed (see 5.3.).  
Subsequently, I will provide arguments for the superiority of a particular set of rules, the AR, which 
illustrates the nature of PCs in its most radical form. Finally, I will address the question how the AR is 
acquired to claim that it is likely to exert an influence on every day contingency judgments with jointly 
skewed base rates. Before summarizing the empirical evidence provided in the empirical articles, the 
next two sections are meant to illustrate how different rule-based and associative models can result in 
PC effects. 
3. Rule-based models behind PCs 
As noted by Fiedler and colleagues (2009, p. 199), jointly skewed base rates can result in PC effects 
via multiple mechanism, like propositional reasoning, contingency models like SoD (White, 2000) or 
reliability differences (Dougherty, Gettys, & Ogden, 1999). I will discuss the first two under the notion of 
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rule-based accounts and will illustrate the latter one using the example of connectionist models of 
associative learning.  
3.1. The Alignment Rule (AR) 
The AR is meant to be an illustrative case of a rule-based PC, exclusively relying on the alignment 
of skewed base rates. As noted by Fiedler and colleagues (2009, p. 197), PC based reasoning is 
reminiscent of the atmospheric effect in syllogistic reasoning (Klauer, Musch, & Naumer, 2000). Logic 
syllogisms have two premises and a conclusion, which leaves room for many different forms of common 
relational-reasoning that bear similarities to PCs. For conditions with different ecologies “Z”, a “PC-
syllogism” of the following form might be considered valid: Mostly X in Z and mostly Y in Z therefore 
most X are Y (adapted from, Fiedler, Freytag, & Meiser, 2009, p. 197). For the present work that will deal 
with a single ecology, a PC-syllogism can be phrased as:  
 More X than Y. 
 More M than N. 
 Therefore most X are M and most Y are N. 
When applied to the case of illusory correlations this could read like: “More people are from Group 
A than from Group B and more behaviors are positive than negative; therefore most people from group 
A are positive and most people from Group B are negative.” Of course, this PC-syllogism does not qualify 
as a logical syllogism as it does not have a valid figure and does not use conventional quantifiers 
(Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991, p. 106). However, it serves well to illustrate what the difference is 
between normative logic and a PC. Even with adequate quantifiers, logic could not relate the first and 
the second premise, as it requires one term to be present in either premise, in other words a joint 
observation. Exactly this is what a PC does not need to infer a relation.  
Consequently, and central to the present work, I define the “alignment rule” (AR) as any kind of 
rule that relates two variables by the alignment in the skew of their base rates without making use of 
joint observations. The PC-syllogism above is but one form. In a more simple form, the AR can also be 
formulated similar to fast and frugal heuristics (Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999): “If two variables have a 
frequent and an infrequent level, then the frequent levels occur together and the infrequent levels occur 
together”. Even more basic, ARs could simply match observations by similarity, specifically by similarity 
of skew. As Goodie and Fantino (1996) showed, observations are readily matched by perceptual or 
intensional (Fiedler, 1985, p. 48) features, creating responses mirroring contingency judgments. In 
analogy, the statistical feature “skew” might be used to match observations in the same way. 
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Depending on the task, it is possible that even more basic processes contribute to PC effects. In 
evaluative priming or the IAT jointly skewed base rates might simply lead to an alignment of response 
tendencies, i.e. most of the time using one key to respond, which can explain PC effects (Blümke & 
Fiedler, 2009; Fiedler, Freytag, & Blümke, 2009). The present work however, does not create task 
conditions that allow for simply aligning response tendencies. Consequently, I will focus on the slightly 
more demanding rule-based mechanisms.  
Before discussing the relation between the AR and other rule-based models behind PC effects, I 
will introduce a possible quantification. I do so to further specify an assumption. Specifically, I assume 
that using the AR becomes more likely given a stronger skew in the base rates. This assumption is driven 
by the fact that, to my knowledge, there is no evidence for PC effects for a joint skew lower than 2:1. I 
quantify the AR by the product of the log-transformed base-rate ratios: 
logAR ∶= log10
BR  P1
BR  P2
  × log10
BR  C1
BR  C2
     (3) 
This definition captures the crucial properties of the AR: exclusive focus on base-rate information, 
the direction implied by a PC (i.e. positive if skewed in the “same” direction, negative otherwise, and 
zero if at least one base rate is not skewed) and stronger predictions given a larger skew of the base 
rates. Additionally, it is symmetric with regard to the base-rate ratios.  
 
Figure 1. Illustrates the predictions of the AR model as quantified by logAR (see Equation 3) as a function of 
predictor and criterion base rates varying from 1/10 to 10/1. 
Figure 1 graphically illustrates these properties by plotting the size of logAR as a function of 
predictor and criterion skews. In sum, a mechanism involves an AR if it exclusively makes use of base-
rate information and predicts a contingency along the alignment of jointly skewed base rates. 
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3.2. Other rule based models behind PCs 
This section serves to illustrate how the AR coincides with other rule-based models of contingency 
judgments that rely on cell frequencies. This is important for the empirical part of the present research 
because some cell-entry based models arrive at the same predictions as AR for the specific tasks and 
stimulus distribution of the present experiments (see Table 3).  
 C1 
 
 
C2  
P1 
 
180 60 240 
 
P2 
 
 
60 20 80 
 240 80  
Table 3. Example of the frequency tables used for the present experiments. 
Specifically, the following rules indicate the same contingency judgment, a positive relation 
between P1 and C1, as the AR: relying on cell A having most entries (A-Cell model); relying on the 
confirmatory diagonal (A+D) having more entries than the disconfirmatory diagonal (B+C, Sum-of-
Diagonals model, SoD); relying on positive hits, i.e. cell A entries, being more frequent than false 
positives (cell B, Hits-minus-False-Positives model, HFP). All of these models (see also, Freytag, Kutzner et 
al., 2009) have received at least some empirical support with a subset of participants using them (Arkes 
& Harkness, 1983; Shaklee & Mims, 1981; Shaklee & Tucker, 1980; Wasserman et al., 1990). Thus, it is 
possible that participants’ contingency judgments in the present work reflect either of these models or a 
combination thereof. Because of this possible confound in the empirical demonstrations of the AR, I will 
use rational arguments for setting AR apart from the above mentioned other strategies concluding that it 
is remarkably accurate under ecologically plausible conditions (see, Freytag, Kutzner et al., 2009).  
However, it is also of theoretical interest to note that different models designed to capture 
deviations from the normative ΔP-model arrive at similar predictions. Under which conditions the 
predictions of cell-entry based models and the base-rate based AR coincide might be a first hint how 
both sources of information interact to create contingency judgments. To assess the relation between 
the predictions of the AR, logAR and the other models, I extended the simulations reported by Freytag 
and colleagues (2009). For all possible 2-by-2 frequency tables that result from varying the cell 
frequencies independently from 1 to 201 (160.000 tables) the models are calculated and subsequently 
correlated. Since the AR is assumed to gain impact with increasing joint skew of the base rates, the 
                                                             
1
 The range of this simulation is restricted in comparison to the remaining simulations (1 to 50) due to computing 
limitations.  
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results are not only aggregated over the whole range of skews but are also split by the joint skew of the 
base rates. I created four exclusive and exhaustive categories of joint skews (see Table 4) ranging from 
no-skew (1:1) to a rather strong skew (4:1). For example, contingency tables were included in the 3:1 
category if predictor and criterion base rates were skewed at a ratio of at least 3:1, but not both stronger 
than 4:1. 
Table 4. Correlations between the results of different models for contingency judgments for two dichotomous variables as a 
function of the joint skew in the base rates.  
strategy AR logAR A-Cell SoD HFP ΔP 
AR 1 .59 .00 .00 .00 -.09 
logAR .97/.98/.94/.70 1 .13 .21 .14 .06 
A-Cell .41/.43/.40/-.02 .45/.44/.39/.09 1 .71 .86 .70 
SoD 1.00/1.00/.78/-.06 .97/.98/.81/.09 .41/.43/.33/.74 1 .58 .67 
HFP .67/.62/.45/-.04 .66/.61/.46/.05 .92/.92/.90/.86 .67/.62/.50/.59 1 .67 
ΔP .87/.71/.36/-.12 .86/.70/.39/-.06 .58/.56/.48/.72 .87/.71/.57/.80 .62/.54/.47/.68 1 
Note: Values in the upper half correspond to correlations for all tables (N=160.000). Values in the lower half correspond to all 
tables of skews 4:1 (N=524), 3:1 (N=1.216), 2:1 (N=8.040), 1:1 (N=150.220), respectively. 
 
The results can be summarized as follows. Over the whole range of skews (upper part of the 
matrix), the AR is largely independent of all the other models. However, given the preconditions of the 
AR become prominent, i.e. a joint skew of at least 2 to 1, the AR correlates to a considerable degree with 
SoD, HFP and A-Cell (minimal r=.40). This implies that, given jointly skewed base rates, cell-entry based 
and base-rate based models will often yield the same judgment. From an ecological perspective, the AR 
and other models based on joint observations do not contradict each other. To the contrary, they might 
often be integrated without confusion in the presence of joint observations. In the absence of joint 
observations, the AR might smoothly compensate the missing information of the other models.  
For decisive evidence isolating AR-based mechanisms, future research could follow the rule-
analytic approach of Shaklee and Mims (1982), selectively using frequency distributions where the 
strategies yield different results. In the empirical part of the present work however, all these models are 
possible rule-based mechanisms behind PCs that are pitted against another class of models that can 
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explain PC effects by differential sample size. The next section will illustrate the basic idea behind 
connectionist models as an example of this set of models. 
4. Associative models and sample size behind PCs 
Models of associative learning propose that jointly skewed base rates bias contingency judgments 
because of the size of the psychological sample on which the judgments are based. They build on the fact 
that skewed base rates necessarily leave one predictor value to be considered more often than the other 
in combination with the criterion. These models, as the rule-based models except the AR, rely on joint 
observations of predictor and criterion. I will now highlight the basic mechanism that elicits this 
sensitivity to sample size in connectionist models for contingency judgments, competition for associative 
strength (e.g., Van Rooy et al., 2003). It is crucial for the present work that connectionist models imply a 
decreasing impact of jointly skewed base rates for an increased amount of overall learning. 
Competition for associative strength is at the heart of models for associative learning (e.g., 
Rescorla & Wagner, 1972) that have been used to describe animal and human contingency learning 
(Allan, 1993) and have been integrated into more complex models for social judgments (Van Rooy et al., 
2003). The critical assumptions are that associative strength between concepts, like predictors and 
criteria, increases with pairings and is limited to a maximum to which learning converges. The delta-
learning rule in the contiguity theory by Rescorla and Wagner (1972) describes how an association 
gradually increases with every pairing of predictor and criterion: 
ΔVn = αβ (λ – ΣVn-1)     (4) 
where ΔVn is the change in associative strength for the predictor when it is paired for the n
th time 
with the criterion and α and β are learning rate parameters that depend on the salience of the predictor 
and the strength of the criterion. Crucially, the decrease in the amount of association change results 
from the difference between the maximal associative strength (λ), the limit of associative strength 
supported by the criterion, and the previously acquired associative strength (ΣVn-1). Thus, the stronger 
the previously acquired associative strength of a predictor with a criterion, the less another pairing will 
change the association. Finally, when the change reaches zero and the learning process has reached its 
asymptote. 
Applied to the simplest case of contingency learning between two dichotomous variables, the 
delta-learning rule implies that both predictor levels are competing for associative strength with both 
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criterion levels. If there is a contingency, for example p(C1|P1)=.75 and p(C1|P2)=.25, it can be shown 
that the difference in associative strengths between P1 and C1 and between P2 and C1 will equal the 
normative contingency index ΔP at asymptote (Chapman & Robbins, 1990). This is also true for the case 
of PCs as they are studied in the current work. Since ΔP is zero, i.e. the conditional probability of C1 given 
both predictor values is .75, the difference in associative strength should be zero at asymptote. However, 
since P1 is presented more frequently, associative strength will increase faster for this predictor value. 
This implies that preasymptotic differences will mimic a contingency between P1 and C1.  
In sum, the very nature of PCs implies psychological samples of different sizes. Some predictor 
values are observed more frequently than others and some criterion values are observed more 
frequently than others. If, as in the present research, joint observations of predictor and criterion are 
possible and the contingency between predictor and criterion is zero, more frequent predictor values 
will be associated faster with more frequent criterion values than less frequent predictor values. Thus, 
preasymptotic learning results in a PC. Crucially for disentangling these sample size mechanisms from 
rule based accounts, asymptotic learning should not result in a PC. This idea underlies the following two 
empirical demonstrations of rule-based mechanisms behind PCs.  
5. Empirical evidence: rule based and associative 
The goal of the following experiments is to disentangle possible mechanisms behind the influence 
of jointly skewed base rates on contingency judgments, i.e. for PCs. Competition for associative strength 
in connectionist models explains PCs for preasymptotic learning in short learning sequences. In contrast, 
the AR predicts PCs for preasymptotic and asymptotic learning, because the extraction of jointly skewed 
base rates can be assumed to happen rapidly and remain largely invariant with extended experience (for 
the robustness of base-rate extraction see, Reips & Waldmann, 2008). 
Consequently, the experiments create conditions where both mechanisms can be expected to 
operate. For the connectionist models this implies learning proper. That is predictors have to be followed 
by criteria to create joint observations. Additionally, associative learning seems more appropriate when 
the criterion is associated with reinforcement. Thus, I created operant conditions, i.e. presented 
valenced stimuli as the criterion and/or reinforced correct predictions of the criterion. In contrast, 
creating conditions where the AR can be expected to operate implies using stimuli with markedly skewed 
base rates. I followed previous experiments which have reliably produced PC-effects with a base-rate 
skew of 3:1. Over all experiments, two crucial characteristic of the stimulus distribution were maintained 
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to pit the mechanisms against each other (a) learning was extended as compared to previous studies on 
PCs (e.g. 96 observations in Fiedler & Freytag, 2004, Exp. 1) and (b) the contingency, i.e. ΔP, between 
predictors and criteria was zero (c.f. Table 3).  
Based on both models, connectionist and AR, I hypothesized that participants’ judgments would 
reflect a contingency between frequent predictors and frequent criteria early on in the learning 
sequence. Based on the AR, I additionally anticipated the same contingency judgment after extended 
experience. 
5.1. Extended operant learning (Kutzner, Freytag, Vogel, & Fiedler, 2008) 
This series of three experiments extends PCs to operant learning. On every trial of a learning 
sequence, either 160 or 320 trials long, participants hear one of two acoustical tones and have to press 
one of two keys. Irrespective of the tone, one of the keys was defined to be the “correct” response in 
75% percent of trials, the other in the remaining 25% of trials. Correct responses were reinforced with 3 
cent and incorrect responses punished with 3 cent. As dependent measure, I assessed the rate with 
which participants chose the more frequently reinforced response given the two tones. If the response 
rates differ conditional on the tone, this can be seen as evidence for a contingency judgment (c.f., Allan, 
1993).  
Results clearly indicate that response rates after 160 or 320 learn trials differ. The rate for 
choosing the more frequently reinforced response is higher after the more frequently presented 
predictor-tone. Additional results (not reported in Kutzner et al., 2008) indicate that the same is true 
early on in the learning sequence, with rates differing already for the first 32 trials (T(20)=2.07, p=.052). 
It also seems that associative learning had reached an asymptote since the difference in choice 
proportions did not change from the first to the last half of trials in Experiment 3. Thus it is unlikely, 
though possible, that further training would have reduced or eliminated the difference in response rates.  
These results contribute to our understanding of PCs in at least three ways. For the first time PCs 
have been shown in an operant learning setting. This speaks to the impact and robustness of the 
phenomenon. PCs are shown in that the more frequently reinforced response is chosen at a lower rate 
after the infrequent predictor value. Thus they are shown even though this implies foregoing the chance 
to maximize reinforcement. Second, manipulating only the criterion base rate was not sufficient to 
produce a PC effects. Though predicted by associative models and the AR, usually both base rates have 
been manipulated at the same time. Thus, the results are direct evidence that it is the joint skew, or 
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alignment of base rates that causes PCs. Third, and crucial for the current argument, the results are not 
easily explained by the current models of associative learning. A difference in choice proportions remains 
at asymptote in spite of an experienced zero ΔP between the cues and correct choices. The next series of 
experiments will extend these insights to a social context. 
5.2. Extended learning in stereotype formation (Kutzner, Vogel, Freytag, 
& Fiedler, 2009) 
Building on the first series of experiments, I studied PCs in extended learning in a social domain by 
adopting a standard paradigm, illusory correlations (ICs, Hamilton & Gifford, 1976). On every trial, 
participants first saw a group label, either referring to an “orange” or a “purple” group and then a 
valenced behavioral description. Again, the behavior was positive or negative in 75% percent of the time, 
irrespective of the group (c.f. Table 3). Participants either passively observed the information like in 
standard IC paradigms or had respond to the group labels, predicting the upcoming valence or making 
approach-avoidance decisions towards the groups. Subsequently, the groups were evaluated.  
Again, results provide clear evidence for PCs after extended experience with information about the 
social groups. Under all conditions, the more frequent group, the majority, was evaluated more 
positively if the behaviors were frequently positive and the minority was evaluated more positively if the 
frequent behaviors were negative. Additionally, analogous to the previous experiments we found 
evidence for the usage of this illusory stereotype, which constitutes a first demonstration of IC-based 
discrimination. When behaviors were frequently positive, majority members were predicted to show 
positive behaviors more frequently than minority members and were also approached more frequently.  
In sum, the results of the two series of experiments provide clear evidence for mechanisms that go 
beyond associative learning. Still, when learning had reached an asymptote, statistically non-predictive 
cues influenced online responses and end-of-learning judgments as predicted by PCs. One possible 
mechanism behind this influence is the AR, a rule based mechanism that is based on predictors and 
criteria sharing levels that are frequent and rare.  
In the current experiments, other rule based models that rely on joint observations instead of base 
rates, specifically SoD, A-Cell and HFP, arrive at the same predictions as the AR. Thus, it is possible that 
participants did rely, at least in part, on other rules as well2. However, providing unequivocal evidence 
                                                             
2 Note that it is impossible (SoD) or arbitrary (A-Cell, HFP) to create stimulus distributions that diverge in 
predictions for AR and the other models, given a ΔP of zero. 
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for but one model, the AR, was not the aim of the empirical work as this has been done elsewhere 
(Fiedler & Freytag, 2004; see also, McGarty et al., 1993). Instead, it served to establish that rule-based 
mechanisms are at work even under conditions that clearly call for associative learning.  
5.3. Discussion 
The conclusion that rule-based mechanisms were at work in the present studies can be challenged 
either by suggesting that other associative models or a different class of models, neither associative nor 
rule based, predicts the same pattern of results. 
PCs, a new form of blocking? I have applied the associative models for the current experiments by 
assuming that both criterion levels compete for associative strength with each predictor independently. 
For example, it is assumed that each group will be associated with each valence according to the relative 
frequencies with which that group is paired with the two valences. However, one might suspect that the 
faster increase in association between the frequent predictor and the frequent criterion level “blocks” or 
hinders the formation of the association between the infrequent predictor and the frequent criterion 
level. Indeed, the obtained pattern could be the result of a blocking experiment (e.g., Dickinson, Shanks, 
& Evenden, 1984). For example, in a forward blocking experiment, first the majority alone and then 
majority and minority together would be paired with positive and negative behaviors. Under these 
conditions one could expect that (a) the majority is more strongly associated with the frequent valence 
than the minority and that (b) both groups are to the same degree weakly associated with the infrequent 
valence. This would result in a larger difference between frequent and infrequent valence for the 
majority. These predictions follow from the assumption that cues, i.e. the predictor values, compete for 
a limited amount of associative strength. 
Though plausible, there is a crucial difference between the current empirical demonstration of PCs 
and blocking experiments: majority and minority have never been paired. To my knowledge, no 
associative accounts exist that would predict this forward blocking without pairings of the competing 
cues. Thus, the current versions of associative models do not provide an explanation of the present 
results. 
However, one could frame PCs as a new form of blocking within inferential accounts to forward 
blocking. These accounts assume inferences like “If cue A on its own causes the outcome to occur with a 
certain intensity and probability, and if cue A and T together cause the outcome to occur with the same 
intensity and probability, this implies that cue T is not a cause of the outcome “ (De Houwer & Beckers, 
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2003, p. 346). A PC account would simply remove the necessity for observing both causes together and 
imply an inference like “If cue A on its own causes the outcome to occur with a certain intensity and 
probability, and if cue A and T together causes the outcome to occur with the same intensity and 
probability, this implies that cue T is not a cause of the outcome. “ This can be taken as another 
illustration of how PCs work: they remove the need for joint observations.  
However, to render this PC-blocking an alternative explanation of the present results an additional 
assumption is needed to explain that the frequent predictor, i.e. cue A, is the focus of attention that 
blocks the infrequent predictor. Recently, Sherman and colleagues (Sherman et al., 2009) tried to argue 
that attention is allocated to the majority first exactly because it is more frequent. Even though 
plausible, this argument seems circular. Additionally, it is based on attention theory (Kruschke, 2001) 
which has been developed using compound stimuli, i.e. cues A and T presented together. Thus, it 
remains unclear whether PCs can fruitfully be considered a new form of blocking. Crucially for the 
current results, this model could also be considered rule based, though the rule seems less parsimonious 
than the AR. Thus, associative accounts for blocking do not threaten the validity of the current 
conclusions. Before discussion how associative models could be revised to accommodate the present 
results, I will discuss another class of models sharing the prediction that pre - but not asymptotic learning 
will reveal PC effects. 
 Memory trace models and noise. Exemplar based models have also been used to explain the 
influence of jointly skewed base rates on contingency judgments, most prominently the account by 
Smith (1991) based on Hintzman’s (1986) memory model and the BIAS model by Fiedler (1996). For 
example, Smith’s model assumes that every observation of a predictor and a criterion leaves a trace in 
long term memory that has different sections to code several aspects of the observations, such as group 
membership and valence. If a judgment about the valence of one group is required, these models 
prompt the memory with an ideal probe of the group-section and receive an echo with an aggregate 
over all relevant valence sections. Both models implement the final valence judgment as the correlation 
between the aggregated memory echo for the valence section and the ideal valence section. Crucially for 
sample-size effects, the models also assume random noise at different stages of the process, e.g. 
forgetting or less than perfect learning. Consequently, more frequent exposure to one groups results in a 
more reliable valence aggregate for this group. Thus, the predictions regarding an extended array of 
observations are similar to those of the connectionist models. The reliability advantage for the more 
frequently observed group or predictor should decrease with increasing observations. This is due to the 
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fact that, as the number of observations increases, the correlation of the memory output and the ideal 
prompt will approach its maximum of 1 for the frequent and the infrequent predictor value.  
However, these models could be modified to accommodate the results. One possibility would be 
to render forgetting for a target trace a function of how many traces have been stored since this target 
trace. This would effectively create a subset of traces that only consists of recent observations. 
Psychologically, this could be interpreted as retroactive inference. If forgetting increases fast enough 
with new observations, this would mimic the limited set of observations for which the models explain PC 
effects. The same is in principle possible for connectionist models even though they do not usually 
implement forgetting. 
In sum, the evidence is in line with the AR as one possible mechanism behind PCs. In the next two 
sections I will argue that the AR is also a likely mechanism behind PCs. First, I will broaden the scope 
from the mechanisms that drive PC effects, to the mechanisms that should drive them. I do so to argue 
that ARs are an adaptive rule for detecting the sign of a contingency and are well suited to work under 
real life constraints. 
6. Adaptive value of the AR (Freytag, Kutzner, Vogel, & Fiedler, 2009) 
The analysis of the adaptive value of the AR has two parts, one that could be termed “possibilistic”, 
the other rational, as it follows the steps 1 to 4 of a rational analysis (Anderson, 1990): define the goals 
of the cognitive system, develop a formal model of the environment to which the system is adapted, 
make assumptions about processing limitations and derive the optimal model. 
The first part follows the seminal work of McKenzie (1994) who showed that seemingly naïve 
strategies, like HFP, are quite congruent with normative indices when considering every possible 
distribution of a 2 by 2 frequency table in a range from 1 to 50. When including the AR (c.f. Equation 2) 
into the simulations, it indicates the same sign of the contingency as normative indices in 73% of the 
cases when the skew is at least 3:1. When considering only contingencies of moderate to strong size, 
larger than .2, the accuracy increases to 95% (see, Freytag, Kutzner et al., 2009, Simulation 1). Thus, the 
AR is valid for detecting the sign of a normative contingency when its preconditions are met, jointly 
skewed base rates. Additionally, it performs at a similar level as the other models. However, the AR’s 
validity in such a possibilistic set of environments is but a first step to determine its adaptive value for a 
decision maker in real life.  
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In a second step, the performance of the AR is evaluated after specifying its exact task, taking into 
account real life constraints and specifying environments in which it possibly has to work. Four 
assumptions are made. To begin with, the critical task is defined as inferring the sign of a contingency in 
a space of possible observations based on a sample. This is different from the previous analysis where 
the task was to correctly infer the sign of a contingency in the sample, i.e. the specific 2 by 2 distribution. 
This inference task might be closer to how contingency judgments are used in real life, to generalize 
beyond the observed sample. Coming back to the opening example, trying to determine whether 
catching a cold in our life is contingent on stress implies being interested in the future. The past 
observations only serve as a tool for inferring this future contingency. Consequently, we changed the 
simulation by creating spaces of possible observations in a first step, and by repeatedly drawing samples 
from these spaces in a second step. Note that this change in the task opens the possibility that the 
contingencies that hold in the spaces of possible observations are not the same ones as in the samples 
due to sampling error. Consequently, the standard for determining accuracy is now the contingency in 
the space, not the sample. This renders normative indices that work on the sample just another fallible 
strategy. 
Further, the assumption is made that information might be unavailable in two ways. First, the 
amount of observations is restricted for a given contingency-inference task. This might be due to 
memory loss in the cognitive system when events are spaced in time. It might also be due to the fact that 
making observations comes at a cost. Thus the simulation implements samples of limited size, i.e. 14 
observations. Second, not all of these observations are joint observations of predictor and criterion. For 
example, when confronted with the task of determining the stress-cold contingency for you, joint 
observations should be available. However, when trying to do so for your partner or child, you might 
only know about a cold but not about stressful events, leaving univariate observations. This constraint is 
implemented by varying the likelihood of making joint observations from 10% to 100%. 
Finally, it is assumed that the contingency to be detected is of moderate size, i.e. .3. Though 
arbitrary, it seems plausible that many important contingency inferences do neither involve close to 
deterministic relations nor extremely weak relations3. Because, our aim is to evaluate the performance 
of the AR, we also vary the joint skew of predictors and criteria. This creates conditions where the AR has 
been found to be influential, i.e. when there is a joint skew of at least 2 to 1. 
                                                             
3
 Changing the size of the contingency to .7 does not change the qualitative conclusions drawn from the results (see 
also, Freytag, Kutzner et al., 2009).  
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The results clearly indicate when AR inferences are valid and even outperform other rule-based 
models (Freytag, Kutzner et al., 2009, Simulations 2 and 3). When the joint skew in the space of 
observations reaches a level of 2 to 1, AR correctly predicts the sign of the contingency in about 75% of 
the cases. Because the base-rate estimates can make use of univariate observations, AR’s performance is 
only slightly impaired when the likelihood of joint observations decreases. This is not the case for its 
closest competitor, SoD. Although performing well on average, the SoD model is sensitive to the 
proportion of joint observations. This property results in a relative advantage of the AR over the SoD 
when joint observations are unlikely. Additionally to being sensitive to the likelihood of joint 
observations, the ΔP model shows a decrease in performance when the joint skew of the base rates 
increases. This leads to a relative advantage for the AR when the joint skew is high and joint observations 
are unlikely. 
In sum, the AR can be deemed a rational model under certain constraints. Specifically, the AR is 
the optimal rule for inferring the sign of a (moderate) contingency when predictors and criteria are 
jointly frequent or rare, at a ratio of at least 2 to 1, and when the likelihood of observing predictors and 
criteria together is no more than 30%. If the latter condition is violated, the AR is at least as good as the 
other rule-based models. 
7. The origins of the AR  
So far I argued that the AR is a possible mechanism behind PCs and, under real-life constraints, it is 
rational to use it. However, how should organisms develop exactly the AR as a strategy among the 
myriads of other possible rules? Answering this question is crucial because the demonstration of usage 
or adaptive value alone runs the risk of fitting data in a post hoc fashion by yet another rule-based 
model. Therefore, in the next section I will provide reasons why organisms are prone to acquire this 
specific rule. I will do so for operant and stimulus-stimulus learning conditions. The basic argument 
builds on the fact that, as I will show, experienced base rates will be jointly skewed given strong 
experienced contingencies in the environment.  
Operant conditions. I will start discussing operant conditions that assume a causal relation 
between the behavior shown by the organisms and reinforcement. For example, imagine you finally 
found out that those weeks of stress are almost always followed by catching a cold, i.e. stress and health 
are strongly correlated in your life. Most likely you will try to avoid stressful weeks. This example depicts 
an operant learning situation because your behavior is reinforced and punished along a systematic 
P a g e  |23 
 
schedule defined by the causal relation in the environment. The example also illustrates the dominant 
reaction to such scenarios, probability matching (e.g., Shanks, 1990). Over a very wide range of 
conditions, humans as well as animals choose behaviors at the rate at which they are reinforced. Given a 
strong contingency between two behaviors and reinforcement, for example p ( reinforcement | behavior 
A ) = .8 and p ( reinforcement | behavior B ) = .2, resulting in a ΔP of .6, organisms will show the behavior 
A 80% of the time. 
Crucially, this probability-matching behavior creates jointly skewed base rates. To illustrate this 
consider Table 5. In the left part the reinforcement schedule described above is applied to an organism 
that guesses, i.e. behaves at random. This might be an illustration of an early stage in a learning process. 
In the right part, the same reinforcement schedule is applied to an organism showing probability 
matching, i.e. choosing the behaviors at the rate at which they are reinforced. The causal relation 
between behaviors and reinforcement results in a skewed base rates of the reinforcement as well, in this 
example a logAR of .2 or an average skew of 3 to 1. 
Guessing 
Reinforcement Punishment  
Probability 
matching Reinforcement Punishment  
Behavior A 40 10 50 Behavior A 64 16 80 
Behavior B 10 40 50 Behavior B 4 16 20 
 50 50 100  68 32 100 
Table 5. Expected frequencies for the same operant reinforcement schedule for guessing (left part) and 
probability matching (right part). 
Thus, given differential reinforcement for behaviors we can control, the normal way of responding 
will create jointly skewed base rates of behaviors and reinforcement in our experience. Before discussing 
how this might lead to rely on ARs, consider situations in which we do not have control over what is 
happening and simply observe. 
Stimulus-stimulus learning. A second way how the presence of a strong contingency in the 
environment might result in doubly skewed base rates in our experience is through sampling error. To 
illustrate this consider Table 6. The upper line depicts a perfect contingency between predictor and 
criterion. The lower line is meant to illustrate three random samples drawn from the distribution in the 
upper line. 
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Environment C1 C2  
P1 50 0 50 
P2 0 50 50 
 50 50 100 
 
Sample 1 C1 C2  
Sample 
2 C1 C2  
Sample 
3 C1 C2  
P1 2 0 2 P1 5 0 5 P1 6 0 6 
P2 0 8 8 P2 0 5 5 P2 0 4 4 
 2 8 10  5 5 10  6 4 10 
 
Table 6. Frequencies tables illustrating an environment with a perfect contingency between predictor (P1 
and P2) and criterion (C1 and C2) and three illustrative cases of randomly drawn samples. 
In the presence of sampling error (sample 1 or 3) the base rates will necessarily be jointly skewed 
as no observations are possible for cells B and C. Of course, this is only true for a perfect contingency. 
Thus, the following simulation assesses how strong this joint skew is on average when there are non-
perfect contingencies in different possible environments. In the simulation I created non-skewed 
environments with varying ΔP’s, ranging from 0.0 to 1.0 (for the algorithm behind the environments, see, 
Freytag, Kutzner et al., 2009). From these environments samples of varying sizes (2 to 14) were drawn 
for 10.000 times and the joint skew in the samples was determined using logAR (c.f. Equation 3). 
Figure 2 depicts the average logAR value in the samples, i.e. logAR’s sampling distribution. Most 
prominently, the joint skew in the samples is inflated in contrast to the joint skew in the environment 
(i.e. 1:1) with increasing contingencies in the environment. This effect is strongest for small samples of 
around 5 observations. At maximum logAR reaches levels close to .15 that correspond to an average 
skew of 2.5 to 1.  
P a g e  |25 
 
 
Figure 2. Average joint base-rate skew (logAR) in samples of different sizes drawn from an environment with 
varying ΔP’s and no skew in the base rates.  
Even though not illustrated, similar inflations of the sampling distributions can be found for 
environments that are skewed. These results coincide nicely with the inflation of the normative 
contingency in small samples (Kareev, 2000). Note additionally, that at under similar conditions the 
normative predictions are not only inflated, but also correctly extract the sign of the contingency in the 
environment most of the time4. Thus, even if predictors and criteria in our environment are not jointly 
skewed, a strong contingency causes sample base rates to exhibit a joint skews on average. 
One of two starting points. I have just shown that given the experience of strong contingencies in 
the environment it is likely to experience jointly skewed base rates as well. Note, that this is the 
complement to what has been shown demonstrating the adaptive value of the AR, namely that there is 
an above chance probability of experiencing a contingency given jointly skewed base rates. Thus, an 
organism has two possible starting points to learn that jointly skewed base rates and contingencies are 
related: situations with strong contingencies and situations with strongly skewed base rates.  
To provide a starting point for the development of the AR, the only assumption that has to be 
made is that strong contingency situations make up an easily accessible category of situations. I argue 
that this is plausible given the importance of strong contingencies for controlling and predicting the 
environment. However, the more this is the case, the higher should be the chance that organisms use 
their learnt above chance probability of skew given contingency, to infer that there is a contingency 
                                                             
4
 Supplementary simulations to those provided in Freytag, Kutzner and colleagues (2009) yield ΔP-accuracies of 
83% correct sign detections for an average sample size 2.5 and an environment-ΔP of .7. 
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given joint skew (Gavanski & Hui, 1992). Once this confusion of the inference direction has elicited the 
AR, it might self-perpetuate due to its validity for inferring contingencies.  
In sum, the fact that organisms inevitably learn that strong contingencies are indicative of jointly 
skewed based rates is probably conducive to the reverse inference that jointly skewed base rates are 
indicative of strong contingencies. Of course, this argument is based on the assumption that organisms 
are sensitive to the contingencies entailed by the joint observations of predictors and criteria in the first 
place (e.g., White, 2000). Thus, reversing the inference direction is yet another instance of joint 
observations and base-rates interacting to produce contingency judgments. 
8. Concluding remarks 
The present work puts forward a three-step argument for a rule-based model for contingency 
judgments that exclusively relies on jointly skewed base-rates, the alignment rule (AR). First, a rule-based 
model is shown to be necessary to explain evidence from a trial-by-trial learning task. Then the specific 
set of rules, termed ARs, is shown to perform well in ecologically plausible conditions when the base-
rates of predictor and criterion are jointly skewed at a rate of at least 2 to 1. Finally, the claim that the AR 
is a psychologically plausible mechanism is substantiated by showing how it naturally follows from an 
organism’s learning history with strong contingencies. 
However, the present work not only argues for the direct influence of jointly skewed base rates on 
contingency judgments. It is also a step towards integrating the direct impact of jointly skewed base 
rates and the impact of joint observations on contingency judgments. Joint observations are provided in 
the learning experiments, the rational analysis presupposes that cell-entry based and base-rate driven 
models compete and the origin of the AR is traced back to instances where joint observations reveal 
strong contingencies. Additionally, it is shown that the direct base-rate influence as modeled by the AR 
and the predictions of cell-entry based models often coincide and might thus supplement each other 
(see 4.2.). Research I currently follow, seeks to elaborate on this interaction between skewed base rates 
and contingency models based joint observations. For example, the predictions of cell-entry based 
models and the AR are independently manipulated (see also, Fiedler, 2009) in paradigms similar to the 
illusory correlation research. It seems reasonable to assume an integration of base-rate information and 
joint observations into contingency judgments given the empirical evidence on humans’ sensitivity to the 
ΔP model in combination with the skewed criterion base rate (e.g., Allan & Jenkins, 1983, Exp. 3).  
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However, there might be many ways how jointly skewed base rates and joint observations interact 
to influence contingency judgments. For example, within a signal detection framework I currently follow 
the hypotheses that jointly skewed base rates might lower the threshold to decide in favor of a 
contingency. Another possible interplay could involve different stages of testing a contingency 
hypothesis. When confronted with multiple important outcomes and multiple possible causes, a starting 
hypothesis is needed. Pairs of outcomes and causes with jointly skewed base rates might create the 
expectation of being related. Thus subsequent search for joint observations might favor these pairs. 
Taken together, I consider the present work part of the long tradition of research on contingency 
judgments that is stimulated by skewed base rates. 
P a g e  |28 
 
References 
Allan, L. G. (1980). A note on measurement of contingency between two binary variables in judgment 
tasks. Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society, 15(3), 147-149. 
Allan, L. G. (1993). Human contingency judgments: Rule based or associative? Psychological Bulletin, 
114(3), 435-448. 
Allan, L. G., & Jenkins, H. M. (1983). The effect of representations of binary variables on judgment of 
influence. Learning and Motivation, 14(4), 381-405. 
Alloy, L. B., & Abramson, L. Y. (1979). Judgment of contingency in depressed and nondepressed students: 
Sadder but wiser? Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 108(4), 441-485. 
Anderson, J. R. (1990). The adaptive character of thought. Hillsdale, NJ England: Lawrence Erlbaum 
Associates, Inc. 
Arkes, H. R., & Harkness, A. R. (1983). Estimates of contingency between two dichotomous variables. 
Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 112(1), 117-135. 
Blümke, M., & Fiedler, K. (2009). Base rate influence: response criterion shift determine IAT and ST-IAT 
effects. (submitted). 
Chapman, G. B., & Robbins, S. J. (1990). Cue interaction in human contingency judgment. Memory & 
Cognition, 18(5), 537-545. 
Cheng, P. W. (1997). From covariation to causation: A causal power theory. Psychological Review, 104(2), 
367-405. 
Cheng, P. W., & Novick, L. R. (1990). A probabilistic contrast model of causal induction. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 58(4), 545-567. 
Crocker, J. (1981). Judgment of covariation by social perceivers. Psychological Bulletin, 90(2), 272-292. 
De Houwer, J., & Beckers, T. (2003). Secondary task difficulty modulates forward blocking in human 
contingency learning. The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology B: Comparative and 
Physiological Psychology(4), 345-357. 
Dickinson, A., Shanks, D., & Evenden, J. (1984). Judgement of act-outcome contingency: The role of 
selective attribution. The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology Section A, 36(1), 29-50. 
Dougherty, M. R. P., Gettys, C. F., & Ogden, E. E. (1999). MINERVA-DM: A memory processes model for 
judgments of likelihood. Psychological Review, 106(1), 180-209. 
Fiedler, K. (1985). Kognitive Strukturierung der sozialen Umwelt. Göttingen, Toronto, Zürich: Verlag für 
Psychologie. 
Fiedler, K. (1996). Explaining and simulating judgment biases as an aggregation phenomenon in 
probabilistic, multiple-cue environments. Psychological Review, 103(1), 193-214. 
Fiedler, K. (2009). Pseudocontingencies override genuine contingencies between multiple cues. 
submitted. 
Fiedler, K., & Freytag, P. (2004). Pseudocontingencies. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
87(4), 453-467. 
Fiedler, K., Freytag, P., & Blümke, M. (2009). Base rate effects in evaluative priming. in preparation. 
Fiedler, K., Freytag, P., & Meiser, T. (2009). Pseudocontingencies: An integrative account of an intriguing 
cognitive illusion. Psychological Review, 116(1), 187-206. 
P a g e  |29 
 
Freytag, P., Kutzner, F., Vogel, T., & Fiedler, K. (2009). On the adaptive rationality of 
Pseudocontingencies. (under review). 
Freytag, P., Vogel, T., Kutzner, F., & Fiedler, K. (2009). Pseudocontignencies by base-rate reproduction. 
(submitted). 
Gavanski, I., & Hui, C. (1992). Natural Sample Spaces and Uncertain Belief. Journal of Personality  and 
Social  Psychology, 63(5), 766-780. 
Gigerenzer, G., & Todd, P. M. (1999). Simple heuristics that make us smart. New York, NY, US: Oxford 
University Press. 
Goodie, A. S., & Fantino, E. (1996). Learning to commit or avoid the base-rate error. Nature, 380(6571), 
247-249. 
Hamilton, D. L., & Gifford, R. K. (1976). Illusory correlation in interpersonal perception: A cognitive basis 
of stereotypic judgments. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 12(4), 392-407. 
Hattori, M., & Oaksford, M. (2007). Adaptive non-interventional heuristics for covariation detection in 
causal induction: Model comparison and rational analysis. Cognitive Science: A Multidisciplinary 
Journal, 31(5), 765-814. 
Hintzman, D. L. (1986). 'Schema abstraction' in a multiple-trace memory model. Psychological Review, 
93(4), 411-428. 
Inhelder, B., & Piaget, J. (1958). Probable dispersions and correlations. In The growth of logical thinking: 
From childhood to adolescence. (pp. 224-242). New York, NY US: Basic Books. 
Johnson-Laird, P. N., & Byrne, R. M. (1991). Deduction. Hove [u.a.]: Lawrence Erlbaum. 
Kareev, Y. (2000). Seven (indeed, plus or minus two) and the detection of correlations. Psychological 
Review, 107(2), 397-403. 
Klauer, K. C., Musch, J., & Naumer, B. (2000). On belief bias in syllogistic reasoning. Psychological Review, 
107(4), 852-884. 
Kruschke, J. K. (2001). The inverse base-rate effect is not explained by eliminative inference. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 27(6), 1385-1400. 
Kutzner, F., Freytag, P., Vogel, T., & Fiedler, K. (2008). Base-rate neglect as a function of base rates in 
probabilistic contingency learning. Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 90(1), 23-32. 
Kutzner, F., Vogel, T., Freytag, P., & Fiedler, K. (2009). Pseudocontingencies in stereotype formation: 
Extending the scope of illusory correlations. (under review). 
McGarty, C., Haslam, S. A., Turner, J. C., & Oakes, P. J. (1993). Illusory correlation as accentuation of 
actual intercategory difference: Evidence for the effect with minimal stimulus information. 
European Journal of Social Psychology, 23(4), 391-410. 
McKenzie, C. R. M. (1994). The accuracy of intuitive judgment strategies: Covariation assessment and 
Bayesian inference. Cognitive Psychology, 26(3), 209-239. 
Mullen, B., & Johnson, C. (1990). Distinctiveness-based illusory correlations and stereotyping: A meta-
analytic integration. British Journal of Social Psychology, 29(1), 11-27. 
Reips, U.-D., & Waldmann, M. R. (2008). When learning order affects sensitivity to base rates: Challenges 
for theories of causal learning. Experimental Psychology, 55(1), 9-22. 
Rescorla, R. A., & Wagner, A. R. (1972). A theory of Pavlovian conditioning: Variations in the effectiveness 
of reinforcement and nonreinforcement. In A. H. Black & W. F. Prokasy (Eds.), Classical 
conditioning II: Current research and theory (pp. 64-99). New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts. 
P a g e  |30 
 
Shaklee, H., & Mims, M. (1981). Development of rule use in judgments of covariation between events. 
Child Development, 52(1), 317-325. 
Shaklee, H., & Mims, M. (1982). Sources of error in judging event covariations: Effects of memory 
demands. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 8(3), 208-224. 
Shaklee, H., & Tucker, D. (1980). A rule analysis of judgments of covariation between events. Memory & 
Cognition, 8(5), 459-467. 
Shanks, D. R. (1985). Continuous monitoring of human contingency judgment across trials. Memory & 
Cognition, 13(2), 158-167. 
Shanks, D. R. (1990). Connectionism and the learning of probabilistic concepts. The Quarterly Journal of 
Experimental Psychology A: Human Experimental Psychology, 42(2), 209-237. 
Shanks, D. R. (2007). Associationism and cognition: Human contingency learning at 25. The Quarterly 
Journal of Experimental Psychology, 60(3), 291-309. 
Sherman, J. W., Kruschke, J. K., Sherman, S. J., Percy, E. J., Petrocelli, J. V., & Conrey, F. R. (2009). 
Attentional processes in stereotype formation: A common model for category accentuation and 
illusory correlation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 96(2), 305-323. 
Smith, E. R. (1991). Illusory correlation in a simulated exemplar-based memory. Journal of Experimental 
Social Psychology, 27(2), 107-123. 
Van Rooy, D., Van Overwalle, F., Vanhoomissen, T., Labiouse, C., & French, R. (2003). A recurrent 
connectionist model of group biases. Psychological Review, 110(3), 536-563. 
Ward, W. C., & Jenkins, H. M. (1965). The display of information and the judgment of contingency. 
Canadian Journal of Psychology/Revue canadienne de psychologie, 19(3), 231-241. 
Wasserman, E. A., Dorner, W. W., & Kao, S. F. (1990). Contributions of specific cell information to 
judgments of interevent contingency. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, 
and Cognition, 16(3), 509-521. 
White, P. A. (2000). Causal judgment from contingency information: Relation between subjective reports 
and individual tendencies in judgment. Memory & Cognition, 28(3), 415-426. 
 
  
P a g e  |31 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Erklärung  
  
Ich erkläre hiermit, dass ich die vorliegende Dissertation selbstständig angefertigt und keine anderen als 
die angegebenen Quellen oder Hilfsmittel verwendet habe. Weder die vorliegende Arbeit noch Teile 
davon sind oder waren Grundlage einer anderen akademischen Prüfung. 
  
Heidelberg, Juli 2009  
  
  
Florian Kutzner 
